What spaceships are made of: steel, tiles, ablators and aluminum

You might have noticed that nearly every spacecraft is made of something different: Starship is bare stainless steel, the space station is mostly aluminum with fabric layers hidden in its walls, Orion’s base is coated in a material designed to burn away, and the space shuttle wore thousands of ceramic tiles. None of this is style. Each material is the least bad answer to a specific problem, and the problems are mass, heat, cold, and cost. Metal that is light and strong on the launch pad may be useless in a re-entry, and a coating that survives re-entry may be too heavy or too fragile to be practical for anything else.

Why Starship is steel

Most rockets chase low weight, so a stainless steel rocket looks like a mistake. SpaceX’s reasoning, as Elon Musk and press coverage describe it, comes down to temperature and money. Stainless steel is cheap, easy to weld, and its strength goes up at the extreme cold of liquid methane and oxygen, with nickel keeping it from turning brittle. Musk has also said carbon fiber handles only about 400 degrees Fahrenheit before losing strength, while steel keeps working at around 1,500 to 1,600 degrees Fahrenheit. That matters because Starship re-enters the atmosphere belly-first and gets hot. Sources describe the body as stainless in the 304L family, though a few say early prototypes used a different grade, so we would not treat the exact alloy number as settled.

The trade is mass. A steel ship needs thicker walls and the heat shield tiles still have to cover the windward side. SpaceX bets that a cheaper, tougher material that can be built outdoors and repaired quickly beats a lighter, expensive one. It is a reasonable bet for a ship that wants to fly often, and a harder one for a lander that has to carry tons of cargo to the Moon.

Tiles and the long fight with heat

Starship’s heat shield is a field of ceramic hexagonal tiles on the side that faces the airflow. Space.com has described a shield of roughly 40,000 tiles on the current ship, a number that earlier reports put much lower, so it depends on which version you mean. On Starship Flight 12, SpaceX deliberately removed a single tile before launch to see how heat and airflow redistribute onto neighbors, and carried two small imaging satellites to photograph the shield in flight. Gizmodo reported minimal damage on that flight, but experts reviewing footage from the following flight pointed to white streaks and what looked like cracked or chipped tiles at some edges. That is the right level of caution. A shield that looks good from a distance is not the same as one you can fly again with no inspection.

The space shuttle used a similar idea with different material. Most of its underside was covered by silica tiles made from very pure sand, light enough to fly and weak enough that they could be damaged by a fingernail or a piece of foam. Its nose cap and wing leading edges, which saw the highest heat, used reinforced carbon-carbon, a stiff composite that can take extreme temperatures. The investigation after the loss of Columbia traced the disaster to a breach in the wing’s leading-edge system. The lesson that matters here is that the most heat-resistant part was also brittle, and a lightweight, thermally excellent shield can be a safety risk in its own right.

Orion’s ablative shield, and what went wrong on Artemis I

A tile survives heat by resisting it. An ablative shield survives by being sacrificed: the surface chars and erodes away, carrying heat with it. Orion’s heat shield uses an ablator called Avcoat, which has a heritage going back to Apollo. It is the right tool for a capsule re-entering at lunar-return speed, which is faster and hotter than anything coming back from low Earth orbit.

On the uncrewed Artemis I flight in 2022, chunks of char came off the shield in a pattern engineers had not predicted. NASA’s investigation reproduced the entry in arc-jet facilities at NASA Ames and examined about 200 samples. Its finding was that Avcoat with low permeability trapped gases inside, pressure built up, cracks formed, and char was released. Areas where the material was more permeable did not crack.

For Artemis II, NASA did not change the shield but changed the path. The agency reported that a shorter entry reduced the cracking and char loss by about a factor of ten. After the April 2026 flight, engineers found char loss at nine spots on the shield, against 103 on Artemis I. NASA said the shield performed as expected; our summary of that flight is in the Artemis II results. Two caveats are worth keeping. The Artemis II shield was, according to reports, even less permeable than Artemis I’s, and Orion’s program manager had said some char loss was expected, not zero. And at least one outside critic has questioned whether the root cause is fully understood. For Artemis III, NASA has reportedly implemented a fix to make the Avcoat more permeable, which is a change to the material itself.

The ISS: aluminum with layered armor

The International Space Station’s pressurized modules are mostly aluminum alloys, the same family used in aircraft. Aluminum is light, well understood, easy to machine and weld, and tolerant of the cycling between sun and shadow. What is less obvious is the defense against micrometeoroids and debris. NASA, ESA and JAXA use “stuffed Whipple” shields on exposed areas: an outer aluminum bumper, then layers of ceramic fabric and Kevlar, then the module wall. The outer layer shatters an incoming particle, the fabric spreads the debris cloud out, and the wall only sees fragments it can take. NASA’s testing used a one-centimeter aluminum sphere as the design threat. Our piece on space debris and Kessler syndrome explains why that threat is getting worse, and living on a spaceship covers what the walls protect.

Aluminum-lithium, carbon composites, titanium

Aluminum-lithium alloys swap some of the aluminum for lithium, the lightest metal, which makes the alloy stiffer and lighter. NASA’s fact sheets say the alloy known as 2195, used for the shuttle’s super lightweight external tank, was about 30 percent stronger and 5 percent less dense than the older alloy it replaced, and the tank was 7,500 pounds lighter. The cost was that it is harder to weld and can be less forgiving. A 2013 report said the SLS program moved its core stage back to the older alloy for that reason, although other accounts say 2195 is still used on Orion; we could not settle that from the sources we found.

Carbon composites are the mirror image of Starship’s steel: strong and light, but expensive and weak when hot. SpaceX’s Falcon 9 uses them for its fairing and interstage, per trade press, but the part that survives re-entry, the grid fins, are titanium, which was a change introduced around the Block 5 version. Dragon capsules use a carbon-based ablator, PICA-X, derived from NASA’s PICA material.

What to take from the pattern

If you remember one rule: a spacecraft is not built of the best material, but of the best material for each place. Cold tanks get alloys that stay tough in the cold. Surfaces that face re-entry get something that either resists heat or burns away. Walls that meet debris get layers. Cost sneaks in everywhere, and it is the reason steel is back in fashion after decades of exotic composites. For another comparison of a fashionable rocket against a historical one, see Starship versus Saturn V, and for how the Starship tiles tie into reuse, our Flight 15 explainer.

Key sources: NASA on the Artemis I heat shield cause, NASA on the Artemis II heat shield, National Academies on station debris shielding.